Matthew Baltz

Ms Hammatt, English III

Mr. Houston, US History

Thesis Paper

"It had been happy for me if I could have lived a private life in peace and plenty, enjoying all the happiness that results from a well-tempered society founded on mutual esteem. But the injury done my country, and the chains of slavery forging for all posterity, calls me forth to defend our common rights, and repel the bold invaders of the sons of freedom."(Thane 20) This excerpt from a letter written by Nathanael Greene to his wife before leaving for war, illustrates completely why Greene, a Rhode Islander of Quaker heritage, chose to become embroiled in America’s Revolutionary War.

There are few men who rival Nathanael Greene in serving such a prominent and important role in the American Revolution. With the exception of George Washington, he was the only American general to serve continuously for all eight years and had Washington been captured or killed, he was to take his place as commander-in-chief of the American army. When reading Greene’s exploits, it is uncanny how he seems to be a part of some of the most famous campaigns fought throughout the whole war, but for the most part receives little recognition. Therefore, for someone as significant as he, yet so ambiguous in our history, it is important to determine his exact role in America’s War for Independence.

Nathanael Greene was born on August 7, 1742, in Potowomut, Rhode Island. (Thane 1) His heritage stems from Quaker immigrants five generations prior, who left Salisbury, England in 1635 to escape persecution for their religious beliefs. His father, also named Nathanael, was a respected minister among the Society of Friends, as well as the owner of a series of forge, grist and saw mills. His mother, Mary Mott, was his father’s second wife, and she regrettably died when young Nathanael was only ten. Nathanael was the fourth of eight boys who survived to adulthood. (Maltbie, internet)

At an early age, Nathanael manifested a strong interest in knowledge and learning, which his father hardly appreciated. His interests concerning knowledge outside of the Bible was almost anathema to the Quakers, but this did little to deter Nathanael who later attended school at the age of fourteen. (Thane 2) He worked at his father’s iron foundary in Potowomut until 1770, when his father purchased a forge at the town of Coventry and put him in charge there at the age of 27. (Adams 569) Prior to that, with the death of two of his elder half-brothers, Nathanael had inherited property, thus making him a freeman in Warwick, which had jurisdiction over Potowomut since the time of Nathanael’s birth. Shortly after Nathanael had moved to Coventry, his father died in the November of the same year.

No stranger to public service even before the war, Greene served as deputy in the General Assembly of Rhode Island from 1770 to 1772, and also in 1775. (Adams 569) With the deterioration of the relationship between England and America, augmented especially in Rhode Island with the infamous Gaspee Affair in 1772, which involved the burning of the hated British patrol ship Gaspee, Greene showed an unusual interest in the military for a Quaker. On September 30, 1773, Greene was cast out of a meeting with the Society of friends for attending a "place of Publick Resort," namely, a military parade. (Adams 569) Later, on July 20, 1774, at the age of 32, Greene married Catherine Littlefield, a young, non-Quaker woman nineteen years of age. This marriage proved to be a long and happy one which lasted until Nathanael’s death in 1786. (JBC, internet)

Greene’s first real military pursuit began when he became one of the first volunteers

of the Military Independent Company of East Greenwich which had gathered informally in the summer of 1774. (Maltbie 8) The decision to join the militia was not without consequences, for taking up arms was strictly against his pacifistic Quaker heritage. Regardless of such inner turmoil, he put in his membership as a private, but this only led to another problem, one which humiliated his sensitive personality.

At an early age Nathanael suffered from asthma as well as a stiff knee caused by unknown circumstances. Despite these ailments, Greene could still participate and excel in sports and recreation, but the newly formed military group, who had gained official status under the name Kentish Guards on October 25, 1774, questioned whether he was fit for service and worried that his limp would make them all look bad. It was only the support of his friends which kept him as a member, but this incident prevented Greene from attaining any deserved higher position, and this vexed him greatly.

The Kentish Guards were composed of respectable young men throughout the community surrounding the Narangasset Bay area, and their organization was loosely based on the British Guards. It was not until the news of fighting at Lexington and Concord in the April of 1775 that they had any real activity, and even their march to the Massachusetts border was halted by Governor Wanton of Rhode Island. However, Greene himself played an active role, though not in combat, for he was appointed to a committee assembling on April 22 consulting with the Connecticut Assembly concerning the common defense of the New England Colonies. (Thane 19)

The consensus reached at this assembly called for the raising of 1,500 men to form an "army of observation." This brigade was therefore divided into three regiments, each consisting of eight companies. On May 8, 1775, Nathanael Greene at the age of 33 was promoted from private to Brigadier General of the Rhode Island forces, an act which has baffled historians to this day. (Maltbie) Nevertheless, Greene undertook his task immediately, leaving his young wife behind, and arrived at Roxbury outside Boston with his Rhode Islanders in late May, 1775. (Maltbie)

His arrival, along with several other colonial forces, had now shown how the fighting in Massachusetts had escalated into a pan-colonial effort. After his entrance outside Boston, which was still in British control, Greene was made Brigadier General of the Continental army on June 22, and stationed at Prospect Hill during the siege of Boston in July under Charles Lee. During this time, Greene managed his brigade with such diligence and care, that it caught the attention of General George Washington, who had recently taken command in the north. Washington was impressed immediately with Greene’s knowledge of military history and began early on to trust his strategic competence. Later, while on visit in Rhode Island, Greene missed the Battle of Bunker Hill on June 17, 1775, and by the March of 1776, Boston had been evacuated. (Maltbie)

Following the action to New York, Greene, after being appoint Major General on August 9, 1776, (Mitchell) spent most of early April traveling south with his brigade, and he took command on Long Island on April 29, 1776. (Maltbie) The situation for the Patriots in New York was bleak, for the island was for the most part indefensible and they were grossly outnumbered by the British fleet consisting of 32,000 men. Both Greene and John Jay favored the idea of evacuating New York and burning the city, but Congress, for the sake of appearances, disliked the prospect and left the final decision to their commander-in-chief. The decision became moot when 20,000 British landed and the Americans broke ranks and retreated during the Battle of Long Island, on August 27. (Mitchell 52) The battle was missed by Greene who had taken ill and for this reason he does not see any real combat until the Battle of Harlem Heights on September 16. (Maltbie) This battle was really only a minor one, but through the Americans standing their ground for the first time, they were able to inflict 200 British casualties at the cost of only 130 of their own. Needless to say, after the disaster at Long Island, Harlem Heights was somewhat of a morale booster.

Despite Harlem Heights, the American situation in New York and the Hudson was weak and untenable, yet Washington still hoped to retain control of the area, regardless of the clear British naval superiority. Currently, the Americans held two forts on the Hudson’s banks, Fort Washington on Manhattan Island, and Fort Lee opposite in New Jersey. During November, the bulk of the American Army had been evacuated to New Jersey, yet Greene felt that Fort Washington should be held not only to prevent the British from launching a drive into New Jersey, but also to prevent Charles Lee’s forces in Westchester County from being threatened. In short, Greene was hoping for another Bunker Hill, for he thought, truthfully so, that the Patriots fought far better defensively and if the tide of the battle took a turn for the worst, the troops could easily be evacuated. His decision was supported by both Israel Putnam and Hugh Mercer, yet Washington was skeptical of keeping untrained soldiers in such a vulnerable position, but he left the final decision to Greene.

The attack on Fort Washington was a complete disaster. On November 15, 10,000 British under General Howe attacked in several directions against 3,000 Americans, hopelessly disorganized with a weak inner force. (Maltbie) The result was the surrender and capture of 2,800 Americans as well as an immense supply cache, and Greene and Washington themselves barely evading the British. (Abbazia 10) Fort Washington was also disastrous for Greene’s reputation, and Washington’s own confidence in Greene was temporarily shaken. Greene himself was distraught by the defeat, saying "I feel mad, vexed, sick, and sorry…" (Abbazia 10)

There are conflicting sources as to who was to blame for the failure at Fort Washington. Some say that the fault lies completely with Greene, while others tend to give Washington some responsibility, for he had the power to overrule the decision. Fort Washington however, did serve a purpose, for it led to a severe change in Greene’s tactics, which he will eventually use in his southern campaigns against General Cornwallis. Greene was now much more cautious and he realized the importance of fighting a war of attrition and the necessity of being able to rally an army again, relatively unscathed, after a engaging in battle.

After the evacuation of Fort Lee four days later, Green played a prominent role in the retreat across New Jersey and led the left wing during the Battle of Trenton on December 26, 1776. (Maltbie) After participating in the Battle of Princeton on January 3, 1777, he spent the winter of 1777 in Morristown, New Jersey and in March he was sent in place of Washington to Congress, who was not satisfied with their Commander-in-Chief ‘s conduct in the war. (RGA 570) After skirmishing with the British in northern New Jersey for the rest of the spring, Greene served an integral part in the Battle of Brandywine on September 11, 1777. (Maltbie) After the British occupied Philadelphia, the Patriots attacked the British outpost at Germantown, with Greene leading the left column. After a series of indecisive campaigns in Pennsylvania, which all served to build up Greene’s knowledge and development as a commander, both Washington and Greene were put under heavy criticism from Congress, amplified especially after Gate’s victory at Saratoga on October 7. (Maltbie)

This presented and even greater issue, for there began much talk among Congressmen and even some military personnel of replacing Washington with Gates. Greene was not saved from such talk, for he was blamed for giving the Commander-in-Chief bad advice, yet Washington restated still his choice of Greene to replace him in the event of his death or capture.

Unfortunately for Greene, this was only the beginning of his trouble with Congress, for during the July of 1777, there was talk of placing a French officer in a command higher than Greene’s. (RGA 570) Such a notion led Greene, Henry Knox and John Sullivan to threaten resignation, leading Congress to be angry not only because of the directness of the threat, but at the fact that the deal with the French was hardly concrete. After demanding an apology from Greene, who resolutely refused to do so, Congress did little else.

Afterwards, Greene’s role in the war effort shifted dramatically, for Thomas Mifflin, the present Quartermaster-General (who coincidentally was a strong supporter of Washington’s replacement) was clearly not managing the army’s supplies efficiently, and was replaced. Washington had already been consulting with Greene on matters of supply, and satisfied with his ability, asked Greene to fill the position. On February 25, 1778, (RGA 570) Greene reluctantly consented, saying that "No one ever heard of a quartermaster in history!" (Abbazia 12) Apparently, his sense of duty to restore an army in shambles compelled him to accept, and Congress officially appointed him on March 2. (RGA 570)

Greene was presented with no easy task as Quartermaster, and he had to deal with scarcity of funds and supplies and the lack of an effective transportation system. He approached this gargantuan task with diligence and care, often spending some of his own money for the war effort, and handling and administering funds reaching as much as $50,000,000 in 1779 alone. (RGA 571) Quartermastering also gave him a valuable experience in the vital role of an army’s supply line and mobility, another facet which he will use to his advantage in his triumph in the south. In addition to being Quartermaster, he still retained some command by his own insistence, and he was still consulted by Washington on strategy and decisions.

On June 28, 1778, he commanded the right division in the Battle of Monmouth, which was the first time the Americans held a field against a sizable British army. (Thane 132) Afterward, Greene returned to his home in Rhode Island and served under John Sullivan in the successful campaign to drive the British out of the state. He spent the winter of 1778-1779 in Middlebrook, New Jersey, where his able control of supplies made American suffering there far less acute. Later, after a severe winter at Morristown and a period with little battle activity in 1780, Greene found his duties as Quartermaster intolerable after Congress refused to give him the authority necessary for dispatching supplies efficiently to the struggling American army. After his resignation, Washington immediately voiced his desire to appoint Greene the highest command in the south, but Congress chose the old Saratoga hero General Horatio Gates.

Afterward, as if to affirm his support of Greene, Washington placed him in charge while he attended a conference saying:

On September 30, 1780, Greene presided over the military court which condemned Benedict Arnold’s accomplice John Andre for spying. He was appointed to Arnold’s position at West Point on October 6, 1780, but Greene did not stay long, for on October 14, he was placed as the commander of the southern army. (Maltbie)

By this time, the situation in the south did not bode well for the Patriot’s cause. By 1789, both Savannah and Augusta were under British control, and Charleston soon followed on May 12, 1789. (Ketchum 322) After being given command of the south, Horatio Gates was crushed at Camden, South Carolina on August 16, 1780, making it the worst defeat ever inflicted upon an American army in any battle. The consequences of the battle were disastrous, for it left not only 1,050 American soldiers killed wounded or missing, but it also insured undisputed British control over South Carolina and Georgia, thus making both Virginia and North Carolina vulnerable. (Mitchell 167) However, it must be noted that although there was no recognizable American field army, there was still partisan guerrilla bands, led most notably by Francis Marion, Thomas Sumter, and Andrew Pickens, who constantly harassed the now dispersed British outposts throughout the state. With the arrival of Greene later in the war, these three men were used most effectively, resulting ultimately in dismembering all British holdings in the Carolinas and Georgia.

After the catastrophe at Camden, which ended Gates’ command, Lord Cornwallis went ahead with the British invasion of North Carolina. It was at this point that the Americans recovered somewhat at King’s Mountain on October 7, where 900 Patriot backwoodsmen and 1,000+ American Tories (British loyalists) clashed, resulting in the destruction of any Tory support in North Carolina and Cornwallis having to retreat across the state. (Morris 83) Even though the Battle of King’s Mountain had marginal effects on the regular British army, it was called by Greene himself as "the first turn in the tide in favor of the Americans." (Furneaux 325)

With Gates out of the picture, the choice of Greene as commander of the south was obvious. With such men as Alexander Hamilton, who said after the Battle of Camden: "For God’s sake, overcome prejudice and send Greene," as well as Washington in favor of Greene, Congress had to look past their umbrage with men of humble beginnings, as well as Greene’s straightforward attitude, and leave Washington to decide. (Morris 83) To Greene, Washington wrote: "It has been [Congress’] pleasure to appoint an officer to command [the southern theater.] It is my wish to appoint you…I have only to add that I wish your earliest arrival, that there be no circumstances to retard your preceding southward." (Morris 327) On November 3, 1780, Greene regretfully leaves his wife again at Philadelphia, en route to Charlotte, North Carolina, as Commander of the Southern Army. (Thane 178)

Upon his arrival in Charlotte on December 2, he found himself in command of a motley force of 1,000 to 2,200 Continentals and untrained militia. Conditions were poor as well, for the army was short of provisions, arms, clothing, shoes, blankets, medical supplies, lumber and nails, and wagons. Morale was also low due to these deprivations, their previous string of defeats, and their fragile esteem for themselves as a fighting force. Greene recalled:

Such was the situation that Greene found himself in when placed in command, and early on he stated that unless the army gets any kind of effective support, "the country is lost beyond redemption." (Furneaux 317)

Meanwhile, the British with no formal threat, had already dispersed their troops into the southern countryside, amassing several far-reaching outposts in South Carolina and Georgia. At the same time, the war was still being carried on by various partisan groups, most notably being Francis Marion, Thomas Sumter and Andrew Pickens, who constantly harassed the British supply trains. Prior to Greene’s arrival, the combined genius of these three men was hardly used effectively, and Greene knew early on the importance and efficacy that the partisans would play.

Francis Marion knew guerrilla warfare the best out of three. Swarthy in appearance and small in size, Marion was one of the most imaginative generals of the war, thus earning him the name of "Swamp Fox." Early into the war, he focused most of his attention on the swampy areas of the eastern South Carolina coast.

A handsome man, Thomas Sumter proved himself to be recklessly brave and a natural leader. His fierce hatred for authority often made him uncooperative, and his guerrilla operations were focused mainly in central South Carolina.

Andrew Pickens brought to the war skill and devotion and matched both Marion and Sumter in daring. He proved himself to be less imaginative than Marion, but more cooperative than Sumter, and his exploits took place mostly in western South Carolina near the Appalachian foothills.

Greene knew that he could count on these men and several others to make the right the decisions, but the task of swift reorganization and replenishment of supplies still needed to be done. He first secured friendly relations with local political leaders as well as the provisional militias and ordered the improvement of roads and supply distribution. For an army ragged with lack of supplies, Greene assured that "no man will think himself bound to fight the battle of a state that leaves him to perish for want of covering." (Abbazia 16)

It was at this point that Greene decided to divide his men and organize them into a "flying army." (Furneaux 325) The command of one part fell to Daniel Morgan, who had previously resigned out of resentment for not being appreciated for the Battle of Freeman’s Farm and Bemis Heights, but had recently rejoined the army following the Battle of Camden. Under his command were two battalions of Maryland Continentals under Colonel Eager Howard, militiamen from the Carolinas, Virginia and Georgia, and 600 cavalry under Colonel William Washington. (Furneaux 325) His orders were to go the western part of South Carolina and harass any British outposts he could in the area. Greene himself took command of 1,000 troops, mainly consisting of militia, and he headed to the north-central section of South Carolina to aid any guerrilla activity there. (Peckham 150)

The decision to divide an already small army baffled Cornwallis, stationed at Winnsborough with 4,000 men, who was left to decide which one of the partitions to follow. After the two armies were 140 miles apart, Cornwallis finally decided on January 2, 1781, to divide his army as well and send the able Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton, a British officer known for being excessively brutal, with 1,100 regulars and Tories to crush Morgan’s division, which he thought posed a far more serious threat than Greene’s. He himself headed stealthily northwestward, to cut off Morgan’s route of retreat from Tarleton. After learning of their plans, Greene warned Morgan on January 13, saying: "Colonel Tarleton is said to be on his way to pay you a visit." (Furneaux 325) Morgan was more than ready to fight at a site called the Cowpens, a hillside once used for grazing cattle.

What followed was one of the best fought battles of the whole Revolutionary War. Morgan’s unorthodox strategy, as well as his clear perception of the capabilities of militia and regulars, were the defining factors ensuring his clear victory. His strategy was simple, but effective. To begin with, the location of his forces were contrary to any existing military doctrine, for he placed his army between the Broad and Pacolet River, thus making escape impossible if the army were routed. His reason for cutting off escape were obvious; to ensure that the untrained militiamen would not, as they had been accustomed to do, turn in flight at the first hint of battle and abandon the regulars. "Had I crossed the river," Morgan recalled, "one half of the militia would have abandoned me." (Furneaux 326)

His army was grouped into three lines of battle. The front was composed of the raw militia under Colonel Pickens, their orders being to fire just two volleys and retreat to safety in the rear. In the second battle line behind them were the Continentals, mostly composed of seasoned Virginians, who were ordered to hold their ground. To the rear were William Washington’s cavalry and Morgan decided to have no protection on his flanks.

On the morning of January 17, Morgan walked through the front militia’s ranks and encouraged them to fire just a few shots, saying: "Hold up your heads, three fires and you are free." (Furneaux 326) Tarleton soon deployed his troops consisting of a front infantry line, two fieldpieces, cavalrymen on both sides and a battalion of regulars in the rear. As the British advanced towards the militiamen 200 yards ahead, the front line waited, for they were ordered not to fire until they saw the whites of their target’s eyes. The militia did as ordered, firing two well aimed shots, largely directed at the officers, shredding the British front line. After two volleys, they retreated as they were told, but the British took this as a full blown retreat and charged right into the awaiting second line of Continentals.

With bayonets the Virginians charged, causing the British to retreat. As the British dragoons entered the fray to cover their retreat, Washington’s cavalry came too, while the militia who had fled behind the cavalry rallied and regrouped to "redeem their credit". (Furneaux 328) The heroic charge of Washington’s cavalry was recounted by James Collins, who said: "In a few moments, Col. Washington’s cavalry was among them in a whirlwind…" (Furneaux 329)

In the face of this, the British "fled with such precipation that they left their fieldpieces behind…they never had an opportunity of rallying." (Furneaux 329) The results of the battle were disastrous for the British, for only Tarleton himself and a few others managed to escape. Morgan listed the British casualties as 110 non-commissioned officers and privates and 10 commissioned officers, with 200 rank and file wounded and 502 prisoners, 29 of which were officers. On the American side, there were only 12 casualties with 60 wounded, as well as the acquisition of 800 British muskets, 100 horses, 2 guns and 35 wagons. (Furneaux 329)

Beyond the mere numbers of the battle, Cowpens, occurring early in 1781 showed that even after the disaster at Camden, the south was still very much attainable. This battle was also a clear exhibition of Britain’s failure to subdue the south completely. Plus, both Morgan’s and Greene’s divisions were still relatively unscathed, and they still held a very serious threat to all British cities, including New York and Charleston. The formation of the battle and Morgan’s strategy at Cowpens was important as well, for Greene will later use a similar arrangement at the Battle of Guilford Courthouse.

The news that Tarleton was annihilated at the Cowpens infuriated Cornwallis who decided to begin his disastrous campaign to crush the Americans completely. He began his march northwest to the Cowpens to overtake Morgan’s army, but Morgan had anticipated this and swiftly headed east toward the Catwaba River. After Morgan continued to evade him, in late January Cornwallis decided to turn his whole army into light troops by destroying all extra baggage and supplies, thereby resting his gambit on the speed of his men.

After Morgan crossed the Catawba, Greene himself joined him with only a few escorts to discuss strategy, with Cornwallis only twelve miles behind. (Furneaux 331) It was decided that Greene’s troops, who were in great need of replenishment at Cheraw, were to march 125 miles north to Salisbury, North Carolina. Morgan and his men would go northeast, were they would meet at the Yadkin River and march into Virginia after crossing the Dan River. Greene planned the campaign well, for the march filled the need to gain the local militias along the way, and it combined nicely with his previous order to the new Quartermaster to explore and map the Dan River and gather boats for transport. Cornwallis also had three to two numbers over Greene, with battle hardened troops, and to lead them on a chase would serve to avoid battle and distance the British from their supply lines.

Cornwallis finally crossed the Catawba on February 1, while Greene and Morgan crossed the Yadkin on February 2, the British arriving hours later. (Aaron, internet) Greene arrived at Guilford Courthouse on February 7 after marching 47 miles for 48 hours, and it is here that he is joined by the army stationed at Cheraw, who had marched north under the command of Issac Huger. (Aaron) Along with Huger came Light-Horse Harry Lee, the father of Robert E. Lee, who arrived with an elite group of cavalry and infantry specializing in guerrilla warfare. Meanwhile, on February 9, Cornwallis arrived at Salem, located 25 miles to the west of Guilford Courthouse, putting him into a good position to cut off Greene from the River Dan, for they were both equally close. In this pivotal juncture, Greene held a council of war with Huger, Morgan and Otho Williams.

The army at this point consisted of 1,426 infantry and 600 militia who were both badly armed and supplied. With the Dan 70 miles away, Greene reluctantly decided to cross it, which meant complete abandonment of North Carolina. First, the army was divided again, with Otho Whilliams commanding 700 light soldiers to march north and screen the retreat of the main body under Greene who marched northeast. Cornwallis assumed that Greene would head west to the shallower part of the Dan, for he was not aware of the pre-positioned boats at the lower end in the opposite direction. His next decision decided the fate of the war, for if Greene were destroyed, Georgia and the Carolinas would be in British hands, and Virginia would soon follow.

Cornwallis fell for the ruse and followed Williams with an extremely arduous march. Now, the march had to be carried out with extreme vigilance, with Harry Lee’s troops doing most of it and fighting minor skirmishes to the rear. On February 13, Cornwallis learned of the deception, finally realized that Greene planned to cross at the lower ford, and followed Williams 20 miles to the east as exhausted as the Americans. Lee’s cavalry continued to skirmish along the way into the night. (Aaron)

On February 14, both sides stopped briefly for rest until 2 p.m. when part of Greene’s troops began cross the Dan. By 5:30, Greene wrote to Williams, saying: "All our troops are over…I am ready to receive you with a hearty welcome." (Aaron) At sunset, Williams crossed, with Lee’s men holding off the British until finally crossing themselves between 8 and 9 p.m. Cornwallis, arriving too late, could do nothing but watch and retreated on February 17 to Hillsborough. Cornwallis’ chase was futile and logistically and tactically lacking, but it taught Cornwallis a lesson which he recounted himself: "Greene is more dangerous than Washington. I never feel secure when encamped in his neighborhood." (Aaron)

The American army, though dilapidated by marching 200 miles, the last 40 of which in 16 hours, celebrated on the other side of the Dan, with all the laurels belonging to Greene. Praise came from both sides. "Bloody" Tarleton later recounted: "Every measure of the Americans during the march from Catawba to Virginia was judiciously designed and vigorously executed." (Aaron) Otho Williams 10 years later corresponded with Light-Horse Harry Lee: "The retreat of the southern army to the Dan River, though now forgotten, was, in my estimation, one of the most masterly and fortunate maneuvers of our beloved Greene." (Aaron) The event was so popular that it led to a song written to the tune of "Yankee Doodle"

Despite all the jubilation of crossing the Dan in one piece, Greene was still faced with impoverished men and an army awaiting aid from the local militias. He soon found that he could not wait any longer for their supposed arrival and re-crossed the Dan on February 23. (Furneaux 333) Cornwallis quickly began his pursuit of the army that had so effectively evaded them, and the two men vied for a superior position for the next ten days. Finally, after being joined by the Virginia militia, Greene was determined to stand and fight at a place called Guilford Courthouse.

The courthouse was situated atop a hill which sloped down gradually for about a half mile. Greene commanded a total of 4,360 men, consisting of 1,600 continentals, 2,600 militia and 160 cavalrymen. (Furneaux 333) With such a high ratio of undependable militia, Greene was previously advised by Daniel Morgan on how to deal with the combination of militia and regulars. Their importance in the upcoming battle was crucial, and Morgan told Greene: "If they fight, you’ll beat Cornwallis; if not, he will beat you, and perhaps cut your regulars to pieces." (Furneaux 333)

Greene situated his men in the Cowpens manner with three battle lines stretching over the hill. The first line consisted of two brigades of North Carolina militia under John Butler and General William Eaton. On their flanks were William Washington on the right and Harry Lee on the left. The second line, situated 300 yards behind, was composed of the Virginia militia with Generals Stevens and Lawson in command. The third line, 400 yards behind the Virginians, was made up of the continentals, with two guns separating Huger’s brigade on the right and Otho Williams’ brigade on the left. Greene himself stood behind the continentals to view the battle. (Furneaux 333)

On March 15, 1781, Cornwallis deployed his troops, consisting of 2,400 British and Hessian soldiers, all regulars with discipline and battle experience. (Furneaux 334) There were also 75 First Highlanders on the right, the Twenty-Third Regiment on the left, and two battalions of Guards to the rear. (Furneaux 334) The battle that ensued was an equal match, with the Americans having the numbers and the British the experience.

After opening the battle with an artillery exchange lasting twenty minutes, the British advanced on the first line, but the North Carolina militia, who had been ordered to fire just two shots and retreat, broke ranks and ran without discharging a shot. Had the North Carolinians done their duty, Greene was confident that they would have won the day. He later remarked of the militia: "They had the most advantageous position I ever saw, and left it without making scarcely a shadow of opposition." (Furneaux 334)

After routing the first line of battle, the British advanced on the second, where the Virginians fired and executed their orders perfectly. Meanwhile, the left American flank in the face of the British onslaught was able to hold firm, while the right gave way and the British began assaulting the third line. In the face of this British assault, the third line discharged when the British were within a hundred feet and charged with bayonets, causing the British to retreat and then later rally. It was at this point that Greene may have been able to attain a complete victory, but knowing that all hope of recovering the south rested with his army alone, he held his hand, knowing the importance of living to fight another day.

Meanwhile, the British were able to bypass the left side of the second line of battle and assault the third line, who broke ranks and ran. Then, Colonel Washington bravely led his cavalry forward to the left to fill the void while the Delaware and Maryland Continentals attacked the British flank where the fighting was especially severe. At this juncture, Cornwallis began discharging grapeshot into the field of battle, claiming both British and Americans. This exchange allowed the British to reform and charge again, but the Americans were able to hold and repulse them back, and it was at this point that Greene decided to withdraw from the field.

Even though Cornwallis claimed victory for gaining the hill, over 530 men were killed and wounded, which totaled about a quarter of his command. (Mitchell 185) On the American side 260 men were killed and wounded, and over a thousand militia disappeared into the interior. Charles James Fox, a British statesman recounted: "Another such victory would destroy the British army." (Morris 84)

Although gaining the hill at a high cost, Cornwallis soon withdrew soon afterward as well, making a hasty retreat with a struggling force into Wilmington, North Carolina until ultimately marching to Virginia to establish communications there. For a short time Greene pursued, but then swung south, for there were still many outposts peppered throughout the south still under British hands, and they all had to be taken before the colonies could be recovered. With a small army under his command, Greene began one of the most unusual campaigns ever recorded in American history, and it is doubtful that anyone else could have executed it so successfully.

Greene knew immediately that he had to rely on the various partisan groups, and, as mentioned before, without Brigadier Generals Marion, Pickens and Sumter, the south may never have been recovered. With the combination of regular and guerrilla troops, Greene developed a strategy that he would use for the remainder of the war. With the smaller bands, he would harass the enemy supply lines and seize the smaller bases to cut off communications, and with his main contingent, he would attack the larger garrisons throughout the Carolinas and Georgia. Above all, the main army had to remain intact, and from the start he knew that it was better to lose the battle then to not rise and fight again.

The actual campaign began on April 9, 1781, after Greene left North Carolina and sent Harry Lee, his legion and a company of Marylanders to join Francis Marion. (Ketchum 333) He first moved for Camden, which was under the command of Lord Rawdon, who immediately swept out of the city with 1,500 troops and attacked Greene’s men stationed at Hobkirk’s Hill. Greene had already arranged his men as he had at Guilford Courthouse, and the actual battle took place on April 25. (Ketchum 333) The battle almost resulted in a clear American victory, but confusion within William Washington’s cavalry led to the eventual American withdrawal to the north. The British lost 258 men, 38 of which were killed, while the Americans lost 270, with 19 killed, 115 wounded and 136 missing. (Furneaux 345)

Greene was extremely disappointed about the battle, for he was hoping for at least some kind of real victory. He wrote to Chevalier de la Luzerne, a French envoy to Congress: "We fight, get beat, rise and fight again." (Ketchum 333) Although winning the battle, Rawdon eventually had to retreat on May 10 from his post in Camden to Charleston, burning the city behind him. In all, Greene had gained the post without winning a battle, which would prove to be typical for him throughout the campaign. (Ketchum 333)

Meanwhile, Francis Marion and Light-Horse Harry were faring well, taking Fort Watson with ingenious siege tactics and later taking Fort Motte. Andrew Pickens also secured Augusta at about the same time. At Fort Motte, Lee and Marion were joined by Greene who sent Marion east to cause as much trouble he could in the Georgetown area, and Lee and the Marylanders west to Fort Granby, a strong point of British occupation. Greene himself proceeded west to Fort Ninety-Six.

Thus far, the plan had been working well, for Greene and the partisan bands continued to maintain the equilibrium necessary to carry out the campaign. Without the irregulars, Greene’s main army would have been overwhelmed early, either at Hobkirk’s Hill or afterwards. The guerrillas, without the main army, would have been hunted down and eliminated one by one. This system of Greene dealing with the British strength and the others strangling the British supply routes carried the war on, and Greene proclaimed: "I will recover the country, or die in the attempt." (Ketchum 334)

Greene was joined by Lee and Pickens during the formal siege of Fort Ninety-Six beginning on May 22 and lasting until June 19, 1781. (Mitchell 195) The post was masterfully defended by the New York Tory, Lieutenant Colonel John Cruger who continued halting the American assault until Lord Rawdon’s arrival with reinforcements prompted Greene to regretfully retreat. Yet again, Greene lost the battle, but won the fort, for Cruger was ordered to return with his men to Charleston and destroy the post behind them.

A series of maneuvers and minor skirmished followed between Greene and Rawdon until, due to the hostile southern summer, the two armies retired to summer quarters. While Rawdon withdrew to Orangeburg and Greene stayed in the High Hills of the Santee, Lee, Marion and Pickens continued their shadowy war, striking the British supply depot at Monck’s Corner and harassing any British activity they could find.

The summer was spent ninety miles from Charleston, with Greene desperately short of soldiers, money and provisions and the threat of desertion always looming over him. For this reason, he threatened any deserters with death, something which weighed heavily on his kindly nature. He wrote to his wife, who he hadn’t seen in two years that he wished "for a peaceful retirement where love and softer pleasures are to be found."

At Orangeburg, Rawdon had handed command to Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Stuart, who, after constant rains flooded the lowlands, led his army to the south bank of the Santee Hills, only sixteen miles from the Americans. Greene saw this as an immediate opportunity and proceeded with an incredibly difficult march through the flooded territory to Stuart, who had now stationed his 2,000 men at a place called Eutaw Springs. (Ketchum 335) The sheer numbers of Stuart’s men made Greene weary of any assault, but when he was joined by Marion and his men he decided to go forward with the attack.

Breaking his usual policy of guerrilla and regular formation, Greene incorporated Marion’s men into formal lines of battle. Meanwhile, Stuart had so far received no intelligence on Greene’s position and remained sat the Springs confident of his position until the actual battle, taking place on September 8. (Ketchum 335) Stuart finally learned from two American deserters of Greeene’s position and sent the Tory Major John Coffin and some cavalry and infantry to investigate the veracity of the report. Coffin was soon overwhelmed however, by John Armstrong’s North Carolinians, followed closely behind by Lee and his cavalry. Soon, Armstrong, Lee, and Greene’s whole army were in pursuit.

The Marquis de Malmedy, accompanied with Marion and Pickens, brought up the center of the assault while Lee, Henderson and Hampton covered the flanks. William Washington and Robert Kirckwood backed up the rear. On the British side, Stuart reacted quickly enough, forming a hasty battle line which began to waiver, resulting in the left collapsing and the right holding firm, mainly because of the skill of Major Majoribanks. The American force all made an attempt on Majoribanks’ line, all of which ended in failure, and chaos and heavy bloodshed ensued. With the right holding firm, the chance of victory was gone, and Stuart had already rallied his men and given support to Majoribanks. Greene also had time to reorganize his men, but decided against smashing against the right, which could lead to victory, but only with a severely diminished force. Not wanting to make the same mistakes he had caused Cornwallis and Rawdon to make, Greene held his men back and withdrew.

Greene at that time made the right decision. For all he knew, the war in the south may still continue into 1782 and even 1783, and he would need a strong army to continue his campaigns. Greene wrote of Eutaw Springs to Washington, saying it was "a most bloody battle - by far the most obstinate I ever saw." (Furneaux 356) Indeed it was, for over a thousand men were killed or wounded, 408 of which were American and 693 British. With his men decimated, Stuart could do nothing else but march back to Charleston, while Greene returned to the Hills to recuperate and begin planning his siege of the city.

Eutaw Springs was an extremely significant battle, for not only did it force the British to abandon the south with no real hope of ever reestablishing any real chain of British posts, it also effected the circumstances to the north. It is doubtful that if Greene had lost at Eutaw Springs, Washington would have risked victory or defeat at Yorktown, and John Adams even wrote that Eutaw Springs was just as important as the British surrender at Yorktown. It should also be noted that Greene was awarded a gold medal for Eutaw Springs, the second largest medal given to an American General for the Revolutionary War.

Thus, Greene had recovered the south without winning a battle, and the British now only held Charleston and Savannah. On October 18, 1781, over a month after Eutaw Springs, Cornwallis surrendered to Washington at Yorktown and the war was practically over. (RGA 572) Greene wrote of the surrender: "We have been beating the bush and the General has come to catch the bird." (Ketchum 342)

Outside of Charleston, although his troops were in complete disorder, Greene held his army together until the British evacuation on December 14, 1782, and he gave his men the satisfaction of marching into the city. (Abbazia 28) Greene later recounted his strategy to claim the south: "There are few generals that have run oftener, or more lustily than I have done…But I have taken care not to run too far and commonly have run as fast forward as backward, to convince our enemy that we were like a crab, that could run either way." (Ketchum 343)

Until the war officially ended with the Treaty of Paris in 1783, Greene held his army together, paying them most of the 10,000 guineas which had been awarded to him by the South Carolina legislature. After being joined by his wife Kitty at Charleston, he began his journey home to Rhode Island to repair his family’s fortunes on August 11, 1783 and soon arrived at Philadelphia where he was greeted by crowds shouting "Long life to Greene!" (Thane 270) He later met Washington at Trenton and visited Congress in Princeton before reaching Newport on November 27, 1783. (RGA 572) Throughout this time Greene was embroiled by the duplicity of a businessman named John Banks who Greene had relied on financially for supplying the army supplies during the war. From the affairs of the scoundrel Banks, Greene was eventually exonerated, but he was left with no property in Rhode Island, leading to his final establishment at Mulberry Grove, an estate outside Savannah in the autumn of 1785. (Thane 275)

Unfortunately, Greene’s life was cut short on June 19, 1786 at the young age of 45. (RGA 572) His cause of death was a severe case of sunstroke caused by overexertion and the intense Georgia sun. At the time of his death, Greene had five children, George Washington, Martha Washington, Cornelia Lott, Nathanael Ray, and Louisa Catherine. His widow, Kitty Greene, later remarried in 1796 and lived until 1814. (RGA 572) The news of his death was carried to Washington by Harry Lee himself who said: "How hard is the fate of the United States, to lose a man in the middle of life. Irreparable loss! But he is gone, and I am incapable to say more." ( Thane 279)

Greene, a self-made genius of war and hero of the Revolution, in the end fulfilled his wish to be remembered in the history books. Most historians agree that Greene was second only to Washington in military prowess, charisma, and ingenuity. Yet to this day, Greene has yet to break free from his Commander-in-Chief’s shadow, usually unrecognized by those not intimately familiar with the Revolutionary War, and often overlooked when praise is given to those who fought for America’s Independence. With a country for the most part out of touch with its own history, Greene’s story is one that should always be remembered, for without the self-sacrificing service of the "Fighting Quaker" from Rhode Island, the country may not have finally gained its independence over 200 years ago.