by

January 25, 1999

One very important affect on the Affair was the nature and origins of the Third Republic. The government began with a manifestly conservative influence, but elections and damaging episodes for the right-wing eventually brought about a Republican dominance. This shift of power and obvious resentment between right and left allowed the Dreyfus Affair to become a tool for politicians on both sides, to discredit one another. Another aspect of the Third Republic, especially between 1893 and 1899, was the many Ministries and Presidents in control during a very crucial time for France. The fact that there were eight Ministries and four Presidents in this period caused short-sighted policies and a lack of long-range goals.

The conservative Right would also play an important role in the Dreyfus Affair, because they consolidated against the call for revision of the original 1894 trial. They had already been discredited by the Sixteenth of May Affair and the Boulanger episode, and the Republic’s anticlerical policies added further to their hostility and defensiveness. Once the Affair began to escalate, the Right, for the most part, continued its association with the Army, nationalism, anti-Semitism, and Catholicism. Eventually, the Dreyfus Affair would serve to discredit, at the very least, the Army, the Church, and anti-Semitism, and there would be an especially blatant shift of power to the left.

The nature of the Army and the General Staff contributed to the initial, corrupt, 1894 trial, and would be an effective impediment, at least for a time, to the cause of revision. Since the Army, and most especially the General Staff, was composed predominately of conservative, Catholic, individuals, and anti-Semitism was a pervasive, if not institutionalized characteristic, it was not surprising that the lone Jewish General Staff officer was suspected of treason. After the 1894 trial, the members of the General Staff nourished the evidence against Dreyfus with unrelated, and even forged documents, prevented the true traitor from being brought to justice, and attempted to destroy the one man who sought to repair the damage of the original conviction.

Several factors contributed to Dreyfus’s original arrest and conviction. Most obviously, he was the only Jew on the General Staff, and compounded with that, he did not share much in common with his fellow officers. He had not attended St. Cyr as most others had, and his intelligence was often misconstrued as pompous. In addition, many of his peers and superiors were threatened, to a degree, by him. Although he was an ardent French patriot, the fact that he was born in Alsace and spoke fluent German caused many to question his allegiances. All of this, combined with unfounded accusations on Dreyfus’s moral character, led to his immediate conviction

One of the reasons why the Dreyfus Affair became so divisive and passionate, was because of a marked increase in nationalism, an unprecedented love of, and interest in, the Army, and an anti-Semitic revival. The defeat of 1870-1871 to the Prussians unleashed much of this sentiment, and since much of the population became obsessed with revenge, the Army took on an unusually important role. "Spy fever" pervaded much of the popular culture, as well as a fear of any foreign element which may make the country weaker. For this reason, Jews were often chastised as French pretenders, and were often associated with the wealthy and influential Rothschilds. In addition, there was an increase of Jewish immigrants from eastern European countries to France, who epitomized what anti-Semites, and even progressive Jews, disliked of the Jewish population.

Much of the Dreyfus Affair was about public opinion, and no other entity had a greater influence on it then the press. Politicians, especially in the latter years of the 19^th century, would also be influenced by what was written in the papers. The anti-Semitic paper, La Libre Parole played a very important role in the 1894 conviction, and attempts to stifle revision and further condemn Dreyfus would continue to come from the press. As questions about the Affair arose, the press would similarly become an effective tool to gain support and awareness for the reopening of the case, as shown with the sensation caused by Emile Zola’s "J’Accuse" article.

The progression of the Dreyfus Affair was also affected social influence. The 1894 trial was only about a Jew, that almost everyone believed was guilty. Nationalism and anti-Semitism would be ideas effective in keeping the Affair closely related to French passions. However, as time went on, the Dreyfus Affair began to take on new dimensions, including the rights of an individual in the Republic, the legality of closed court sessions, and whether or not a judicial error could, or should, be revised. These issues were what politicians, and the people at large could rally behind.

All of these elements contributed to the Dreyfus Affair at a certain time, and to a certain extent. Historians to this day disagree about what was behind this divisive episode, but most do agree that it had immense implications upon the French people.

In order to understand the Dreyfus Affair, a basic understanding of the complicated progression of events becomes important. This section is meant to clarify what events constituted the Affair, giving particular emphasis upon those which coincide with the causes behind it.

The arrest of Alfred Dreyfus was precipitated by the finding of a bordereau in mid-September, 1894. It was obtained from the German embassy by a cleaning woman in the employ of the Statistical Section, which concerned itself with counterintelligence. The bordereau had been sent to the German military attache in Paris, Colonel Maximilian von Schwartzkoppen, an incompetent, indiscreet man who indulged in some espionage, but not very secretively. Colonel Henry was the first to come across this document, which outlined what the true traitor, who was later revealed as Major the Count Ferdinand Walsin-Esterhazy, intended to sell. After realizing the implications of what he had found, he eventually informed his superior, Colonel Sandherr, who in turn, notified Mercier, the Minister of War.

It was concluded that only someone with a general knowledge of the different bureaus could have been the author of the bordereau, and samples of it were circulated to the chiefs of each of the bureaus to see if anyone recognized the handwriting. No progress was made until Lieutenant Colonel the Marquis Albert d’Abovill of the Bureau of Communications and Transport decided that it could only be a General Staff trainee, and while looking over the list of possible suspects, the name of Alfred Dreyfus was first chanced upon. The name alone was enough to raise the question of his reliability, and many officers had unfavorable things to say about the outspoken and fiercely intelligent captain. His handwriting was similar enough to convince Sandherr, who wondered why he had not thought of the lone Jewish officer immediately, and he informed his superiors. Major Armand Du Paty de Clam, after being assigned as chief investigator, was sure of Dreyfus’s guilt, even after one of the handwriting experts claimed it could have been someone else. Mercier’s order to arrest the suspect immediately and get the matter over with, brought hasty action from de Clam, who found a handwriting expert to concur with their findings, and plans were made for the arrest.

Dreyfus was ordered to Ministry of War on Monday, October 15, where de Clam, under false pretenses, had Dreyfus write a dictation for him. Satisfied with what he believed was incriminating behavior from Dreyfus, he arrested him on the spot, offering him subtly the opportunity to commit suicide. The court-martial would not begin until December 19^th, and the guilty verdict shocked both Dreyfus’s lawyer and his family, who thought he would be acquitted due to lack of evidence. One factor contributing to the guilty verdict was the illegal submission of documents, designed to link Dreyfus with the Germans, to the judges just prior to the decision. Despite the illegal errors in procedure, the hasty arrest, and the flimsy evidence, Dreyfus was degraded in a public ceremony and sentenced to life imprisonment on Devil’s Island, off the coast of South America. The chief of the Statistical Section, Sandherr, knew the danger that the Dreyfus case presented, and before his death, he ordered Henry to "nourish" the secret dossier. Henry would work on this task steadfastly and he would include unrelated, and forged documents in the file.

The death of Sandherr led to the appointment of Major Picquart to the Statistical Section on July 1, 1895. This event becomes very important, because when Picquart discovers that there is still traitorous activity, he realizes the possibility that Dreyfus may have been wrongly accused. When Picquart introduced the new document, the Petit bleu, he was told first by General Gonse to exercise extreme caution, and keep the two affairs separate. Picquart eventually realized that no matter how much evidence he presented that would exonerate Dreyfus, no steps would be taken to revise the case. The upper members of the General Staff realized the potential danger of Picquart and ordered him on assignments, many of which placed him in danger, that would keep his nose out of the case. Picquart, due to his profound sense of honor and respect of the Army, kept, for the most part, his inquiries secret, and only confided in his lawyer friend Leblois after he thought his life was in danger.

But other forces beyond the Army’s control would unravel their efforts to keep the Dreyfus case in the past. The continued activity of Alfred’s brother, Mathieu, kept the Dreyfus case from being forgotten, and he obtained the support of the Jewish writer, Bernard Lazare, and Joseph Reinach. Also, the vice-president of the Senate, Auguste Scheurer-Kestner based on conversations with Reinach and with Picquart’s friend Leblois, became convinced that an error had been done. Even though his talks with the present Minister of War, Jean-Baptiste Billot, yielded little results, he would continue to take an active role.

Up to this time, Mathieu Dreyfus still did not know who the true culprit was, but after he published a copy of the infamous bordereau, a banker by the name of Castro recognized the handwriting and found it to be similar to his client, Major Walsin-Esterhazy. (Snyder, 142) Mathieu met with Scheurer-Kestner, who not only confirmed the name, but also published an article in Le Temps on November 14, 1897. In it, Scheurer-Kestner states that "If the Ministry of War would begin an organized inquiry and carry it through, it could prove without difficulty that another man is guilty." (Snyder, 143) The next day, Mathieu publicly names Esterhazy, and La Libre Parole publishes an article, written anonymously by Henry, which denounces Picquart as an agent of the "Syndicate."

At this point, Esterhazy began to take an active role in defending himself, and the War Office began to fear that he would sue Mathieu and Scheuer-Kestner for libel, thereby leading to a messy civil inquiry. A court-martial preceding for Esterhazy would be the best way to handle the situation, because it would exonerate Esterhazy, just as two previous inquiries had, avoid an unreliable jury, and confirm, at the same time, Dreyfus’s guilt. Clearly, by this point, the War Office and Esterhazy had their fates intertwined with one another. The men previously involved in the 1894 conviction, Gonse, de Boisdeffre, du Paty de Clam and Henry, had already been either directly or indirectly protecting and conversing with Esterhazy. As a result, their survival was based on his acquittal. (Chapman, 165)

With the order to prosecute Esterhazy on December 4, 1897, Prime Minister Meline gave an opening remark designed to "reassure the Army, public opinion and the Chamber." (Bredin, 228) In his speech, Meline did just that :

He also advocated the continuation of the "res judicata" policy, which in effect kept all the actual evidence secret, on the official grounds of national security.

The Esterhazy trial lasted only two days, and resulted in his unanimous acquittal. The cause for revision was given a serious blow, but Emile Zola, on January 13, 1898, published his famous letter to the President of the Republic entitled, "J’Accuse…!" ("I accuse") (Chapman, 374) In it, he accused all the men involved in the two trials of covering up evidence and allowing an innocent man to stay condemned. Urged on by his colleagues, War Minister Billot prosecuted both Zola and Clemenceau, the publisher of the newspaper l’Aurore, for libel, but only on the charges which would keep the 1894 evidence out of the trial. On January 23, both were found guilty, given a fine, and sentenced to prison.

On February 26, Picquart was officially dismissed from the Army, which ultimately meant he could now openly join those seeking revision. (Chapman, 148) The change of government in June, 1898, resulted in the appointment of War Minister as Godefroy Cavaignac, who was determined to clear up the Dreyfus case completely. He was staunchly anti-revisionist, but ordered a thorough investigation of the secret file, which by now contained over 4,000 documents. (Wernick, 120) In a speech before the Chamber on July 7, he confirmed Dreyfus’s and Esterhazy’s guilt, and read openly three documents which supposedly were conclusive of their guilt. Unfortunately for Cavaignac, one of the documents was discovered to be a forgery, and on August 30, Henry confessed before Cavaignac and was arrested. The next day, Henry committed suicide, Esterhazy fled to Belgium, and de Boisdeffre resigned.

By now the tide for revision had unalterably changed, making it inevitable. The months before the retrial on August 7, 1899 were painfully slow, but indicative of the new characteristics the Affair began to assume. The Army continued to be resistant to revision, and consistently clung to the notion that it would only destroy the country. Politically, the shift to the left was made complete with the beginning of Waldeck-Rousseau’s ministry. This trial rendered yet another guilty verdict for Dreyfus, but with extenuating circumstances. On September 19, Dreyfus was pardoned by the President, and Waldeck-Rousseau, on November 17, introduced a general amnesty bill to the Chamber of Deputies. (Lewis, xiv) Dreyfus would not be fully rehabilitated until 1906.

An undeniable influence on how the Dreyfus Affair was caused, handled, and eventually concluded, was the characteristics of the Third Republic. How it was established, who it was composed of, how it was influenced, and what actions it took played a major role in the Affair. The Third Republic, with all its shortcomings, in the end not only affected the Affair, but was affected by it.

The Third Republic was unique because when it was founded, it was actually not expected to last very long. Ironically, it would be one of the most long lasting of the French regimes since the Revolution of 1789, lasting from 1871 to 1940. But its longevity does not find its roots with a triumphant, Republican, origin. The National Assembly, given the task to form a new government, in 1871 had a 400 to 250 monarchist majority. (Shirer, 35) An undeniable factor that was prevalent throughout the whole process, was the idea that, had the Royalists and Bonapartists been able to agree upon a king, the French nation would have found itself centered around one. By the time the Constitution was completed in 1875, it did indeed seem to be the framework for a throne, at least according to those with monarchist inclinations. Nevertheless, conservatism seemed to be most popular, at least among those with power, and Adolphe Thiers insisted without it, "…there would be no Republic." (Shirer, 39)

The first test on the new government came in 1877, over the naming of the Premier. Even though the Senate still consisted of a conservative majority, the Chamber of Deputies, since the 1876 election had a Republican majority of 363 to 180. (Shirer, 39) The corollary choice of Leon Gambetta, the arch-Republican of the chamber, was unacceptable to the conservative President MacMahon. When the Chamber rejected his selection of a moderate, the choice of a conservative Republican, Jules Simon, left MacMahon discontent. MacMahon proceeded to send a letter of reprisal to Simon, leaving him no other alternative but to resign. Not stopping there, MacMahon named a new Premier, dissolved the Chamber, and called for new elections, which only resulted in another Republican majority. Zealous monarchists hoped to take this opportunity to overthrow the regime, but MacMahon refused to cooperate, and in 1879, he resigned as President.

This episode was immensely important. It was a devastating blow for monarchists, right-wing conservatives, and even the Army and the Church. The Third Republic was now cemented as a democratic, Parliamentary regime, with a President, following the resignation of MacMahon, as little more then a figurehead. Also, from this time on, the Chamber would choose to elect weak men to fill this position. An impotent President did indeed minimize the still valid threat of a "man on horseback," as Boulanger would illustrate, but at the same time, it precluded the opportunity for such a man to take a definitive and effective position on heated, partisan matters, like the Dreyfus Affair would eventually become.

While this was going on, the legislatures of 1877-1881 continued its purges of non-Republican elements in the government, and took steps to limit the role that clericalism played in education. These policies continued in the legislatures of 1881-1885, in the Judiciary. (Chapman, 38) Nevertheless, the army still remained open for such conservative elements, a trend that had begun several years earlier, after the embarrassing defeat of 1870-71. The policies of the Republican Third Republic seemed to exacerbate the importance of the army for the right, because there was very few positions in government they would be eligible for.

Another episode would soon discredit and weaken the arch-conservatives even further. General Georges Boulanger, appointed Minister of War in 1886, not only brought about much needed reforms in the Army, but also became, in a very short time, one of the most popular men in France. His increased belligerence towards Germany and Parliament, his popularity among certain right-wing leaders and Republican Radicals, and his obvious sway with the population as a whole convinced moderate Republicans to neatly replace him in May, 1887, after the new government convened.

But Boulanger was too popular to be forgotten in the ranks of the Army, and his successful election to the Chamber, followed by a call for revision of the Constitution on June 4, 1888, united his coalition of Socialists, Radicals, Bonapartists and Royalists. (Shirer, 44) His election in three provincial by-elections in August, 1888, soon gave him the opportunity in January 27, 1889 to run for election in Paris. (Shirer, 45) His strong defeat of the Republican candidate set the stage for a march on the Presidential palace and a coup d'etat but Boulanger hesitated, and instead went home to his Mistress. His chance would not come again, especially after a High Court of Justice found him guilty of plotting to overthrow the regime and he fled to Belgium, where he would commit suicide two years later.

But the Boulangist threat left far more of a mark on France then the man actually did. Not only had he almost brought down the Republic, he also became a symbol for all the discontent toward the government, its corruption, and failure to do something about the economic and social problems the country faced. Another element which Boulanger represented were those looking for "la revanche" against Germany, and it also reflected how the conservative right had adopted such nationalistic inclinations after the left had abandoned them. Nevertheless, the right did decline greatly, bringing about decisively the death of Royalism, Imperialism, and the "man-on-horseback."

Through its survival of these three episodes, the Third Republic demonstrated how strong it actually was. But the Parliament, and the Third Republic itself was hardly a consolidated entity. The Radicals on the extreme left adhered dogmatically to the Jacobin tradition, and advocated a centralized government, anticlericalism, an aggressive foreign policy, labor laws, and an income tax. The leader of this group, until his defeat in 1893, was Georges Clemenceau. Those in the center (dubbed as Republican Opportunists) were much less extreme, cautious, and gradual in their approach to government, and hoped to restrict government interference in private life. The Radicals and Opportunists only found common ground on the limiting of the church’s role in politics and education. Lastly, the declining Right, securing its election from support from the provinces and the clericals, were still a force to be reckoned with, especially under the leadership of Comte Albert de Mun. Needless to say, coalitions between these groups were infrequent and mediocre at best, never lasting very long. Also, the frequent Ministries and Presidents, resulted in not only a lack of action, but a lack of responsibility. That is one of the reasons why, at the Esterhazy court martial hearings and then the Zola trials, the bulk of the deputies were loath to act in ways other than silence and indecisiveness. To take a definitive stand one way or the other, in many cases, would have been political suicide.

But when the tide of the Affair began to shift, especially after the suicide of Colonel Henry, it was in the best interests of those in the Chamber of Deputies to voice their support, which in most cases lay with the Dreyfusards. The rise of Waldeck-Rousseau was a testament to this swing of the pendulum, and the subsequent elections in the Chamber further reflected it.

Throughout the Dreyfus Affair, the role of the those to the right of the political spectrum was an important one. During the last half of the 19^th century, those on the right consisted of, but were not exclusive to, rural aristocrats, extremely wealthy bourgeoisie, zealous nationalists, both virulent and casual anti-Semites, and monarchists. The ideas they represented were anti-democratic, anti-parlementaire, anti-intellectual, and hostile to reason. (Shirer, 91) What was also important about the right was the fact that, for the most part, they lacked definitive leadership, and instead became maintainers of bitter resentment. (Shirer, 92) Since the Third Republic had been conceived, in the interest of political survival, many reactionaries and conservatives began their association with moderate Republicans. Those who either failed to shed their previous politics, or chose not to, were often times replaced by Republicans in the civil service and the judiciary. An immensely important area that was for the most part spared this conservative purge, was the Army.

Since the start of the Third Republic, the right experienced a steady political decline. The Sixteenth of May Affair and the Boulanger episode were both clear blows to conservatives, but their power was still felt, especially in the countryside. But beyond their own discrediting scandals, there was also the notion that such conservatives were out of step with the French nation. To put it another way, they were out of vogue, and were instead viewed, progressively speaking, as a step back, instead of forward. (de la Gorce, 23) This idea would cost the conservatives in the Chamber of Deputies, but not with the people at large, where many of their interests found immense, and often zealous support.

One was their embrace of nationalism and foreign belligerence. Towards the end of the Franco-Prussian War, it was the Right who advocated peace with Germany, and the Left, epitomized by the Paris Commune, who refused to admit defeat. From the establishment of the Third Republic through the last quarter of the 19^th century, the left tended to take a comprising stance on foreign policy, especially in relations with Germany, and discarded calls for la revanche. The right, however, did the complete opposite, and found much of their support by appealing to the heightened sense of nationalism, much of which found its origin from the humiliation of 1870, and the Republic’s continued subservience to their looming German neighbor.

Hertz, in Nationalism in History and Politics described why nationalism, especially after 1870, became such a powerful influence on the French people:

The rise of Boulangism was a testament to the popularity of such a nationalism and belligerence towards Germany. The compromising foreign policy among Gambetta’s Republican disciples, such as Jules Ferry, and Jules Meline, contributed to Boulanger’s popularity, especially among the nationalist Radicals. (Weber, 194) The call for revanche resonated with the population at large, further adding to Boulanger’s support.

In addition to nationalism, Catholicism became an increasingly important element of the Right. Eugen Weber describes this trend in My France, saying that the "Nobility had moved through Royalism to Catholicism, the defence of the Church having proved a better proposition than the restoration of the monarchy." (Weber, 189) Catholicism, despite the increased anti-clericalism of the Third Republic, continued to be a cornerstone for much of the rural population, and the unrepentant bourgeoisie. But among much of the French population, Catholicism alone could not bring about concerted, pro-clerical organization. Anti-Semitism, as Zola contends, would soon become the instrument that many Catholics would use to win back popular support, in an atmosphere especially ripe for such intolerance to be fomented. (Weber, 289)

Another important characteristic of the Right was their loss of political influence and undeniable decline, thereby putting them on the defensive. A new political elite, consisting of middle and petit bourgeoisie, were sincerely Republican and secular. They hailed from both urban and rural areas, and were composed of doctors, lawyers, professors and modest landowners. (Bredin, 34) The rural aristocrats and extremely wealthy bourgeoisie were not only against their principles, but were left with only so many channels to combat them. The very influential press and the Army became two such channels, and both of these entities proved to be very important throughout the progression of the Dreyfus Affair.

Needless to say, the characteristics of the Dreyfus Affair would find much of their origins along the inclinations of the Right. Much of their interests had been vested with the Army, which would in essence be put on trial along with Dreyfus, Esterhazy, and Zola. The Affair also brought to question what place such zealous nationalism, clericalism, and anti-Semitism had in the Third Republic, and after the Henry suicide in 1898, many conservatives found themselves on the wrong side of what was in the best interests for the French nation.

The Army of the Third Republic made a number of changes following the humiliation of 1870-1871. Many reforms were a testament to this, including obligatory service for all male citizens, changes in open field maneuvers, the establishment of the Ecole Superieure de Guerre in 1876, and a general reorganization of the Superior War Council and the General Staff. (Bredin, 15) But despite such reorganizations and advancements, there were several problems that were allowed to flourish, including elitism, prejudice, inadequate superior officers, and uncompromising attitudes. All of these factors would allow for the opportunity of the Dreyfus Affair to originate, and at the same time prevent the Affair from coming to a painless end.

The Army’s popularity and conservatism were two of its most strident elements. Georges Sorel, in his Reflexions sur la violence commented that "The clearest and most tangible manifestation of the state that it is possible to have, and the one most firmly attached to its origins, is the army." (de la Gorce, 28) During the last quarter of the 19^th century, the Army began to receive increased attention, and with it, increased popularity. It was through these men, the French believed, that revenge over the Germans and the restoration of Alsace and Lorraine would come about. Such respect and adulation would ultimately contribute to the notion that the Army was a sacred entity, even to the point that its infallibility had to be maintained, even if it cost the life of a Jewish officer.

The composition of the Army would play a very important role. For many reasons, the Army was attractive to those with conservative, Catholic backgrounds. One reason was due to the similarities between the Army and the Church. Both were conservative entities, and both believed in hierarchy, duty, and service. In addition, the humiliating German defeat, and the constant reminder of it by the lost provinces served as a rallying call to those anxious to restore France’s former glory. That is why, throughout this period, many who had enrolled in St. Cyr, came from country estates, still staunchly reactionary and for the most part untouched by the ideas of the Revolution. (Chapman, 38) In addition to this longing for military greatness there were also economic reasons. Declining prices in agriculture effected many land proprietors, many of which were conservative, and young men from this sector often sought the Army for financial stability. (de la Gorce, 24)

For the General Staff, conformity seemed to be an obsession. Most, if not all of its members shared the same backgrounds, ideas, and were inspired by the same principles. (de la Gorce, 37) The Law of 1818 prevented membership into the Staff from being drawn from fighting troops, but the defeat in 1871 called for a reorganization of the Staff. New guidelines were set in place so as to prevent a closed circle, inexperienced in warfare from dominating the Staff again, but many previous Staff officers still retained their positions. (Chapman, 43) By 1894, when the revelation of treason came about, the General Staff was still the conservative, predominately Catholic, and hopelessly anti-Semitic entity, it always had been.

The highest ranking position on the General Staff was the Minister of War. Appointed in 1893 by Jean Casimir-Perier, Auguste Mercier’s equanimity with politics and reputation for sound judgment insured his popularity, especially with the new Prime Minister Charles Dupuy. (Lewis, 85-86) But a number of incidents, including the Turpin Scandal, and a mishandling of 60,000 conscriptions put the otherwise successful War Minister on edge. When news of the bordereau reached him, he was, needless to say, anxious to find the guilty party, for he knew all to well, that such a case could either make or break his reputation. He also began to be criticized constantly by the anti-Semitic newspaper, La Libre Parole. This curious situation, where the Minister of War would have such vested interest in the finding of the traitor would contribute not only to the false arrest, but to anti-revisionist sentiment.

Another important area was the French counter-intelligence section. The Franco-Prussian war precipitated the creation, in 1872, of a special service in the ministry supposedly meant to deal with "statistics." This Statistical Section was joined administratively to the second bureau of the General Staff and was under the direct control of the chief, or deputy-chief of the General Staff of the Army. In actuality, this "statistics" section was the French intelligence response to its German counterpart, but it would not be until 1887, under the leadership of Commandant Jean Sandherr, that it would really come into its own. (Bredin, 42)

The Statistical Section soon became a product of its director. Sandherr was born in Mulhouse, was an anti-Semite, and a fanatical patriot. The organization he ran was somewhat amateurish but for the most part successful. He put much enthusiasm into the work, as did his other agents, who were never more than a half dozen in number. Among these men, Sandherr cultivated the idea that they were given a sort of divine mission, one which they alone could do right. They included Commandant Albert Cordier, Commandant Hubert Joseph Henry, Captain Jules Lauth, Captain Pierce Matton, and Felix Gribelin. (Bredin, 43-45) Henry, an ardent patriot who shared Sandherr’s anti-Semitism, dominated much of the work, especially after Sandherr’s increased deterioration with creeping paralysis.

The nature of the Statistical Section created the opportunity for a miscarriage of justice like the Dreyfus Affair. Had incompetence, anti-Semitism and unprofessional tendencies not been so pervasive in this organ of counter-intelligence, the true author of the infamous bordereau would have been discovered. Instead, Sandherr and his underlings, urged on by Mercier, were eager to assign blame to the most obvious and vulnerable person they could find who could conceivably have been responsible. At the time, the evidence that they had seemed to be enough to secure an arrest and a trial, but soon it would not be enough, and the call to "nurture" the damning evidence against Dreyfus would be issued. There was little remorse among those involved. Sandherr’s response to any doubts of his guilt proved to be tell-tale: "It’s obvious that you don’t know the Jews. They’re a race without honor or pride. For hundreds of years they’ve done nothing but betray." (de la Gorce, 38)

Many aspects of Alfred Dreyfus left him vulnerable to such false accusations. They included his birthplace, religion, wealth, intelligence, personality and career path. The fact that he was the only Jew on the General Staff made him stand out, and for that reason, it was not surprising that Sandherr, lacking leads and time, would suspect his guilt.

Alfred Dreyfus was born in Mulhouse, on October 9, 1859 to a family of Alsatian Jews. (Bredin, 11) As a result of the Franco-Prussian War, the territories of both Alsace and Lorraine became under the control of Germany, and for a limited period of time, inhabitants of this region were given the option of leaving. Among those opting to do so was the Dreyfus family, who, unlike several fellow Alsatians, took French citizenship extremely seriously. (Lewis, 3) Alfred would eventually attend the Realschule in Basel, Switzerland, where, with much difficulty, he would master the German language. Instead of pursuing a career in the family business, young Alfred instead, due to his patriotism, and freedom to undertake anything he wished, decided to become a soldier in the French army.

After attending school at College Sainte-Barbe in Paris, and later in College Chaptal, Alfred would eventually qualify to attend the Ecole Polytechnique in 1878. Two years later, he graduated thirty-second in his class and entered the Army as a second lieutenant. After promotion to first lieutenant and a stint with the Thirty-first Artillery Regiment, Alfred was posted in 1883 to the First Cavalry Division in Paris, where he would excel for the next five years. (Lewis, 8) By 1889, he had been promoted to captain, and after attending artillery school in Bourges, he was accepted into the War College on April 20, 1890. (Lewis, 11)

For an Alsatian Jew like Dreyfus to attend the War College was a bit of an aberration. Also, the fact that Dreyfus had attended the Ecole Polytechnique, not St. Cyr, as the majority of his colleagues had, created yet another gulf for Dreyfus to overcome. The top students of this college were guaranteed appointment to the General Staff, and for the upper-class, predominately Catholic nobility, the idea of a Jewish officer among them was unsettling to say the least. The fact that Dreyfus was indeed third in his class did not help matters, nor did his aloof, highly confident, and intelligent demeanor. Also, Dreyfus throughout this time enjoyed a very secure and wealthy lifestyle, and this must have vexed many of his fellow officers, especially those members of the upper-class experiencing monetary difficulties.

Another factor was beyond Dreyfus’s control. His years in the Army had seen a revival of sorts for anti-Semitism and in April, 1892 several articles in La Libre Parole, a violently anti-Semitic newspaper founded by Edouard Drumont, began to warn of Jews in the Army. Drumont claimed that "The Jews hardly had a toe-hold on the Army when they began, by every means, to try to gain control of it." (Lewis, 18) He argued that this posed a very grave danger since Jews already controlled French finances, as well as the bureaucracy and judiciary. Dreyfus certainly never spoke of how disquieting such sentiment was, and he, for the most part, ignored it. This behavior was hardly surprising, not only because he was quiet anyway, but because he rarely identified himself with Jews, and was hardly a religious man. But as duels began to be fought, most notably between the Marquis Amadee de Mores and Captain Armand Mayer, which resulted in Mayer’s death, it became very hard to ignore.

Due to unfair marks from an anti-Semite, Dreyfus graduated ninth in his class, instead of third, but was still guaranteed entrance into the General Staff. Major Georges Picquart, a former instructor of Dreyfus’s who did not particularly care for him, was very weary of his presence on the General Staff. He explained later that "Anti-Semitic prejudices were already abroad in the General Staff… I knew also that by assigning a Jewish trainee to a section that did not concern itself with secret matters I would perhaps spare him certain embarrassments." (Lewis, 21)

In accordance with new regulations, Dreyfus would serve six months in each of the four bureaus of the General Staff. His service in the First Bureau earned him excellent ratings, but after moving on to the Fourth, he suffered from the anti-Semitism of both the colonel and lieutenant-colonel. They further disliked him because of his cool confidence and outspoken intelligence, and judged him as "An incomplete officer, very intelligent and very gifted but pretentious and, from the point of view of character, conscience, and service conduct, failing to fulfill the requirements necessary in order to be employed by the General Staff." (Lewis, 24) He excelled during his next tenure in the Second Bureau, and even, on one occasion, impressed the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General the Marquis Raoul Le Mouton de Boisdeffre. But it is important to note that throughout his time on the Staff, he acquired no contacts or protectors among the superior officers, as many other trainees had. Dreyfus, with his gifted military capabilities thought that they would best serve him in terms of upward mobility, and when he would eventually be arrested for treason, this lack of sympathy among his superiors would most definitely cost him.

Throughout the Dreyfus Affair, the press enjoyed a remarkable and unprecedented influence. In fact, the power they exercised was in some ways stronger than those in positions of power, like members of the Chambers of Deputies. After all, men like Celemenceau, Drumont and Jaures would ultimately exert far more influence as journalists then as members of parliament. (Bredin, 518) Why had the press become so important? The very nature of the Dreyfus Affair would be centered around public opinion, and it was no accident that rural and poor areas lacking press influence due to limitations in circulation, would throughout the entire process be immune from the hysteria the press would often times incite. Not only would the press sway public opinion, it would also effect what actions Parliament would take when dealing with the Affair.

The press would play a role from the start of the Dreyfus Affair, from the time of Dreyfus’s arrest to the time of his first trial. On October 29, 1894, the anti-Semitic newspaper La Libre Parole was notified by Major Henry that an act of treason was being investigated, which was exactly two weeks after Dreyfus’s arrest. (Snyder, xii) By November 1, the name of the traitor was leaked and the press campaign would be set in motion, participated in by all the major newspapers including La Libre Parole, L’Autorite, Le Journal and Le Temps. Within the articles were recurring themes often mirroring popular sentiment, like hatred for Jews and Germany, love of the homeland and the Army, and a persistent fear that such treason was an epidemic in society.

The anti-Semitic newspapers used the case as an excellent opportunity to advocate their principles. They called for a ban of Jews from the army, and accused Dreyfus of being protected by Jewish politicians and the wealthy Rothschilds. Pervasive in much of their arguments was the notion that Dreyfus, like all Jews, was not really a Frenchmen. Drumont, in his article appearing on December 26, 1894 entitled "The Soul of Dreyfus," argues that "In order for a man to betray his country, it is necessary first of all that he has a country, and that country cannot be acquired by an act of naturalization." (Snyder, 95) In addition to assaults on Jews, the right-wing and nationalist press sought to discredit Mercier, the Minister of War, as well as the government for covering it up. Count Henri-Victor de Rochefort, in an article in L’Intransigeant explains Mercier’s role: "The negligence, the stupidity, and the bad faith of our War Minister really make him a part accomplice of the traitor and explains to us his efforts to give as little importance as possible to the documents." (Snyder, 94) Eventually, Mercier would become a steadfast anti-Dreyfusard, mainly due to his responsibility, along with his underlings, in Dreyfus’s arrest.

Beyond the issue of Dreyfus’s guilt, which all papers were in agreement upon, came the conflict of whether or not his trial should be in open, or closed session. (Bredin, 92) Those in favor of keeping it closed included La Patrie, L’Intransigeant, and Le Petit Journal on the grounds that it was the only way of keeping secret important military information, which undoubtedly would arise during the trial. Those against it included Le Siecle, Le Figaro and L’Echo de Paris, who argued that it would only prolong the scandal and lead to inquiries of a possible cover-up. In the Jewish paper Archives Israelites they called for an open session, not with hopes to exonerate Dreyfus, but "to prove that we are not an inferior race as our detractors claimed, but, on the contrary, a race of the first order." (Lewis, 47-48) This sentiment was a reflection of most Jews in the country, especially progressive ones, who were eager not only to disassociate themselves from a likely traitor, but to avoid being put under attack. Despite all these calls for an open session, voiced especially fervently by Dreyfus’s family and defense lawyer, who hoped that it would reveal the flimsy evidence on which his arrest was based, the trial ultimately was conducted behind closed doors.

The guilty decision satisfied all papers, not only because they were unaware that forged documents were given secretly to the judges just prior to the decision, but also because Dreyfus had already been painted, based on the statements from his peers and superiors, as a contemptible villain. Georges Clemenceau, who would ironically become one of his most powerful defenders, elaborated on this sentiment in La Justice: "He has no relative, no wife, no child, no love of anything, no human - or even animal - ties, nothing but an obscene soul and abject heart." (Bredin, 98) At this point, Dreyfus had no support, apart from his friends, family, and lawyer, and it would only be after he had at least a part of the press on his side, that revision could be possible.

The intervention of Emile Zola, displayed how much power the press had. On December 13, 1897, he wrote a letter addressed to the youth of France, and stated with excellent insight how he perceived the Dreyfus Affair. He argues that "No one denies that there has been a traitor, all one asks is that it should be the guilty man and not the innocent one to expiate the crime." He urges the youths to "Put aside the imbecile anti-Semitism, with its ferocious monomania which sees a Jewish plot sustained by Jewish gold seeking to thrust a Christian in the place of the Jew into an infamoust gaol." He also stresses that the whole affair has been feeding off of the initial judicial error, and that silence and cover-up only make it worse. In conclusion, he speaks of the importance not only of legal justice, but of a higher justice which "accepts as a fundamental principle the fallibility of all human judgment." (Snyder, 163)

His next letter was addressed to the whole French nation, and in it he states:

He also felt that public opinion had been led astray, and that "a hundred newspapers repeat daily that public opinion does not wish the innocence of Dreyfus, that his guilt is necessary to the safety of the country." He goes on to condemn a number of newspapers for their sensationalism and lack of ethics, and warns that a continued love of the Army would only lead to a dictatorship. (Snyder, 168)

By far, however, Emile Zola’s most effective letter came just after the court-martial vindicating Esterhazy. Published by l’Aurore and entitled "J’Accuse!" Zola accused all those he felt were guilty for the injustices he had seen, saying, "I accuse the first court martial of having violated the law in convicting an accused person on the evidence of a document that had remained secret, and I accuse the second court martial of having covered up this illegality by committing in its turn the judicial crime of knowingly acquitting a guilty person." (Thomas, 96) By the end of the day, the article sold over 200,000 copies, and anti-Semitic riots broke out in provinces and Algeria. (Chapman, 179) In addition, a petition for revision was organized and signed by 3,000 intellectuals, writers, and artists, including Anatole France and Claude Monet.

The sensation caused by the article was very indicative of what the press was capable of, and what it was not. His article did succeed in causing the government to act, and they did so by putting him on trial. At the same time, despite all the uproar and rancor among the intellectual and conservative elements of France, there was still very little interest among the working class. (Chapman, 181) Drumont, Rochefort, Clemenceau, and finally Zola, all realized how powerful the press had become, and used it, very effectively, as a tool to obtain their respective goals.

The Dreyfus Affair also aggravated many social ideas held by the French people at the time. Nationalism and anti-Semitism were two very prominent themes often pervasive in the French attitude toward the case. Also, there were conflicting ideas about what place an individual’s rights had in the entire process, and whether or not one should be sacrificed for the national good.

A heightened sense of nationalism brought about not only an unprecedented interest in the Army, but also a fear of any divisive element that could make France weaker. The Boulanger threat awakened this nationalism, and many of the anti-Dreyfusards used it to their advantage. (Weber, 194) A recurring idea throughout the Affair was that a revision would only make the country, and the Army weak, so there should not be one. De Boisdeffre knew the power that the Army had on this issue, as shown in his testimony at the Zola trial, where he stated "If the nation has no confidence in its Army’s leaders, in those responsible for the national defence, they are ready to leave the heavy task to others." He knew, like others on the General Staff, to what extent France had vested its hopes of national greatness in the Army, and it was demonstrated time and again that revision would hurt the Army and the nation.

There was indeed something to be said about the dangers of a prolonged affair to the nation. In a telegram sent on September 19, 1898, by Bernhard Von Bulow, the German State Secretary of the Foreign Office, it was stated that "It should not sadden us that French generals and the General Staff have been discredited - and especially the chauvinistic and the clerical officers who are militarily the most efficient among them." (Snyder, 112) But at this point, there was far too much evidence of a miscarriage of justice for the call for revision to go away, and it was actually in the nation’s best interests to revise the verdict and get the whole Affair over with.

A frequent flaw in thinking among the anti-revisionists was the idea that those seeking a new trial were not thinking in the nation’s best interest. Men like Juares only became involved when he realized that a judicial error had been done, and he knew that not having the case revised would ultimately hurt the country. If trials were being held in secret from the public, if false evidence could lead to convictions, and if trials could not be corrected, what rights did the individual really have in the country? It was these rights that Juares fought for. He was no less nationalistic because of this, he was actually more so than other Socialists at the time. (Morgan, 264) He always thought that treason should be punished, indeed, it was he who called for the death penalty in 1894 for the act that Dreyfus supposedly committed.

Another issue that frequently clouded the judgment and rose the passions of many French people at the time, was the increase of anti-Semitism. Nationalism and xenophobia contributed only partly to the Dreyfus Affair, and it is very unlikely that such a thing could happen to a Turk or an Armenian. (Weber, 288) Several factors contributed to this new fear and hatred for the Jew. There was a new immigration of Jews to France in the last half of the 19^th century, a frequent association with wealth and the Rothschilds, and signs that Jews were beginning to consolidate around the idea of Zionism.

Immigration from eastern European and Russian Jews to France was one of the catalysts of anti-Semitism. In 1870, there were 24,000 Jews in Paris, in 1881, there were 40,000, and by 1930, there would be 150,000. (Zeldin, 1038) These Jewish immigrants were immensely different from progressive Jews in France, who were actually more French then Jewish. These Jews had embraced the ideas of the Revolution and looked upon these stereotypical Jewish immigrants with dread and scorn. Bernard Lazare in his early writings hoped to stop "the continual immigration of these predatory, rude, and dirty Tartars (East European Jews) who come to feed upon a land that is not theirs." (Weber, 290)

Another pervasive idea was that the Jews controlled the finances and bureaucracy of the nation. A mystique surrounded the Rothschilds, a famous, wealthy and influential Jewish family, that they were behind any economic slump and any failed business venture (as shown with the Panama scandal.) Another problem was brought about by the original Jewish emancipation, because Jews thought themselves equal, the law thought them equal, but much of the population did not feel the same way. (Weber, 292)

There was also outspoken anti-Semitic leaders. Eduoard Drumont founded the Anti-Semitic League and the infamous La Libre Parole. His writings often were enough to shape opinion against the Jews. A member of the Chamber of Deputies, Denis from Landes, asked that the Jews "be re-channeled toward the center of France, where treason is less dangerous," after the 1894 trial. (Bredin, 136) During the Zola trial, Premier Jules Meline participated in anti-Semitic outbreaks, saying "The Jews who have foolishly unloosed this prepared campaign of hatred, brought down upon themselves a century of intolerance - the Jews and that intellectual elite which seems to enjoy poisoning the atmosphere and inciting bloody hatred." (Shirer, 60) This quote also illustrates the idea that Jews were a consolidated entity, which, with the exception of the international and as of yet weak Zionist movement, could not be further from the truth. (Zeldin, 1038)

French society had much to reckon with, and the Dreyfus Affair brought much of these rivaling camps into action and consolidation. The Germans looked at it a different way. The Ambassador to Paris, Count Munster said "The Parisian is completely irresponsible when it comes to politics, especially by anything concerning Germany. The superficiality and the passion of the Parisian leave him little time for reflection, and for that reason the yellow press here has a most dangerous influence." (Snyder, 107)

The strength of the Dreyfus Affair is its amazing elasticity in cause and meaning. One view could say that it was mainly about anti-Semitism, another could say it was about national honor, and justice. There is always the danger of taking too narrow a view of the implications and causes of a certain event in history. On the same token, there is the threat of reading to much into historical accounts, applying too much weight to insignificant and incidental similarities, and assigning too many corollaries to the event itself. This paper has presented what causes and conditions might have contributed to the Dreyfus Affair, for their is no denying that something was definitely going on in France in the last years of the 19^th century to cause a minor act of treason to escalate into the proportions that it did.

Bredin, Jean-Denis. The Affair: The Case of Alfred Dreyfus. New York: George Braziller

Inc., 1986.

Chapman, Guy. The Dreyfus Case: A Reassessment. Great Britain: Ricard Clay and

Company, Ltd., 1955.

Chapman, Guy. The Dreyfus Trials. New York: Stein and Day, 1972.

(Referred to as Chapman2)

de la Gorce, Paul-Marie. The French Army: A Military Political History. New York: George

Braziller Inc., 1963.

Lewis, David L. Prisoners of Honor: The Dreyfus Affair. New York: William Morrow &

Company, Inc., 1973.

Shirer, William L. The Collapse of the Third Republic : An Inquiry into the Fall of France

in 1940. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969.

Snyder, Louis L. The Dreyfus Case: A Documentary History. New Jersey : Rutgers

University Press, 1973.

Weber, Eugen. My France: Politcs, Culture, Myth. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard

University Press, 1991.

Zeldin, Theodore. The Oxford History of Modern Europe, France: 1848-1945. Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1997.

Morgan, Roger. "The Second International." Purnell’s History of the 20^th Century. 2

pp. 263-269.

Roberts, J.M. "Socialism: The 19^th Century Background." Purnell’s History of the 20^th

Century. 2 pp. 259-261.

Thomas, Marcel. "The Dreyfus Affair." Purnell’s History of the 20^th Century. 1

pp. 92-97.

Wernick, Robert. "The Officer Who Was No Gentleman." Smithsonian. 20 (August 1989)

1. 115-129.